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Abstract: 
It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an 
intention the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. 
Peter Carruthers (2007) has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of 
intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the 
intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of 
intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the 
challenge Carruthers’ argument throws up for accounts that also rely on the notion of 
settling a question for intention acquisition, but who also want to maintain at the same 
time that knowledge of intentions in the first person case is not observational. 
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It seems obvious that I know about my own intentionsi in a different way than I know 
about your intentions. When I want to know your intentions it seems I need to observe 
your behaviour and then infer the invisible mental state that explains it.ii  This does 
not seem to be something I have to do in order to know about my own intentions. In 
my own case I simply make up my mind what I am going to do and once I have done 
that I have acquired the intention in question and at the same time know that I have it. 
There is no need for any observation of behaviour or any inference. This asymmetry 
is pre-theoretically very intuitive and it is one of the main reasons why many 
scientists and even more philosophers are sceptical about the so called theory theory 
in the mindreadingiii debate that holds that the asymmetry is an illusioniv. But while it 
is clear that the asymmetry claim has a lot of intuitive pull it is far less clear how to 
give a convincing account of it. The literature on this topic is enormous and very 
sophisticated and this paper could not attempt to even begin to do it justice. 
 
 Instead it will focus on a very specific heuristic that philosophers have used in order 
to clarify what it means to have an intention and ask whether a better understanding of 
this heuristic could help us to disentangle the controversy about how it is that we 
know our own intentions. The heuristic in question is the idea that in order to acquire 
an intention to x one must settle the question whether to x.   This heuristic has been 
employed widely. It originates in the philosophy of Elisabeth Anscombe (1963) and is 
very much alive in the tradition that builds on her work, but the heuristic has also 
recently been used by different thinkers to clarify the idea of what it is to have an 
intention in the context of the cognitive sciences. Al Mele for example has used this 
idea for an argument that is supposed to show that in the Libet experiments there is no 
unconscious intention preceding the conscious intentionv (e.g. Mele 2009) and 
crucially Peter Carruthers has used the idea of settling a question in the context of 
defending his interpretative model of the mind (Carruthers, 2007, 2011). 
Carruthers’ work is of specific interest here because he uses the idea of settling a 
question to argue for a model of the mind in the theory theory tradition (i.e. the 
tradition that is most sceptical of the self-other gap), while traditionally the idea of 
settling a question has been employed to give an explanation why it is that we know 
of our own intentions in a different way than we know of the intentions of others.  
It is this interesting use of settling a question for two diametrically opposed positions 
on the self-other asymmetry question that is the focus of this paper.  
 
After a short outline of the way in which both positions use the idea of settling a 
question to make their point the paper will proceed to ask whether it can explain why 
it is that the two positions can use the same idea to come to such different 
conclusions. Options here are that maybe the two do not mean the same by settling a 
question. This would be an important result, because it would mean that we always 
would have to check which sense it is that we are using when making an argument. It 
could obviously also be the case that one of these understandings is simply the more 
appropriate one.  Another possibility would be that what we mean by settling a 
question is a hybrid of the two notions. 
Finally, it could also be the case that there is only one notion. In which case it will be 
interesting to see, whether it really is the case that one and the same notion can be 
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used to arrive at these very different positions or whether one of the positions uses the 
notion for a bad argument. 
 
1) Why settling a question helps to explain the self-other asymmetry 
 
In his seminal monograph ‘Authority and Estrangement’ Richard Moran develops an 
account that gives a very interesting explanation of the self-other asymmetry. One 
critical feature of this account is an emphasis on the agency that is involved in 
knowing about one’s own mental states. When attempting to find out whether I really 
believe that the sun never shines in Scotland, I will not normally work like a 
psychologist and try to find evidence that a belief is in my head and it would seem 
odd to go to a psychotherapist or a neuroscientist to find the relevant beliefs. Instead, I 
will simply deliberate and collect evidence for the relevant proposition. Looking out 
of the window I might find that indeed the sun is not shining at the moment, but as 
soon as I go back a couple of months in my memory I will presumably find one of the 
rare instances when the sun was actually shining. I will then have found out that the 
proposition in question is false. Sometimes the sun does shine in Scotland. The 
critical point now is that it seems as if by settling this first order question in 
deliberation about whether or not the proposition in question is actually true I have 
also settled the second order question of whether I believe it to be true. Moran talks 
here about the transparency of the belief question. The reasons for ascribing the belief 
that p to me are transparent to the reasons that I have for p. 
  As Moore famously pointed out it would be very odd to sincerely assert a 
proposition p (the sun sometimes does shine in Scotland), while at the same time 
asserting sincerely that I don’t believe that p. 
It is worth emphasising however that while this does sound like a nonsensical thing to 
say in the case of oneself, this is clearly not because the sentence is contradictory. 
Obviously, it is quite possible that someone believes that p, when in fact –p is the 
truth of the matter. Given the abundance of rain in Scotland it would not be surprising 
if someone held the belief that the sun never shines in Scotland, despite the fact that 
there is relatively convincing metereological evidence that this belief is false.  
The strangeness of Moore’s paradox only arises in the case of self. The reason for this 
asymmetry according to Moran is that only in the case of self am I responsible for 
coming up with the first order judgment. When observing someone else forming 
beliefs I am in a purely spectatorial role, but when thinking about my own beliefs this 
is not the case. I am not only observing myself I am at the same time the agent that is 
acquiring the beliefs. And I am acquiring the beliefs by deliberating about the subject 
matter and settling the question of whether or not p obtains. Obviously, this is not the 
whole story here. Settling the question of whether p does not automatically entail that 
I know that I now judge that p. Moran has an intriguing and contested story here 
about how to close that gap, but for now it is enough for us to understand the role that 
settling a first order question plays in the acquiring of beliefs. 
 
 
Moran’s main target states are beliefs, but it is easy to see how he can produce a very 
similar argument for the case of intentions. While for beliefs we are settling the 
question of whether a certain p is the case, in the case of intentions we are settling the 
question of what to do. Again, we are not ‘looking under the hood’ to use Moran’s 
expression, to see whether we can find an intention but instead we are deliberating 
which of the available courses of action is the best one (see e.g. Moran p.105 for a 
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discussion of intention formation along those lines).vi A nice way to illustrate the 
difference between thinking about one’s future actions in a theoretical way and the 
normal deliberative way is the case of the gambler. A person who is addicted to 
gambling might well know in a theoretical psychological (looking under the hood) 
way that she is very likely to gamble again tonight, but having this knowledge does 
not mean that she by knowing this automatically acquires the intention to gamble. In 
contrast, she does acquire an intention when she after deliberation decides that she 
will not gamble tonight, because she feels that not gambling is the best thing to do 
over all. The reasons for acquiring the intention here are again transparent to the 
reasons for not gambling. Obviously by the way, this does not mean that she will not 
end up gambling after all, but for now she has settled the question about what to do 
tonight.  It is important to stress this last point.  Intentions obviously do not always 
lead to actions, because otherwise it would seem that phenomena like akrasiavii or re-
consideration would not be possible once one has an intention. That would obviously 
be absurd. So critically, all that is required for the acquisition of an intention is that 
for the moment practical deliberation has come to an end and the person has settled 
the question. 
 
 
2) Why settling a question shows that we know of our own intentions in the same way 
we know of the intentions of others 
 
Carruthers (2007) bases his main argument for the idea that we know about our own 
intentions in the same way that we know about the intentions of othersviii on two main 
arguments. Firstly there is the incredibly rich empirical literature that seems to show 
that subjects are surprisingly badly informed about their own motives for acting.  This 
has been dubbed the automaticity juggernaut (Kihlstrom, 2008) or zombie challenge 
(Vierkant et al, 2013) and refers to findings that show amongst other things that it is 
possible to manipulate the decision making of subjects from cases as trivial as the 
speed with which they walk to the elevator to moral decision making without subjects 
realising that their decision had been modulated by these influences. It could also be 
shown that subjects fail to realise which decision they made and that they are willing 
to justify why they made decisions that they never made. ix  
In addition famously, Daniel Wegner (e.g. Wegner 1999) showed that he can induce 
in subjects the belief that they intended to do something when in fact they had no such 
intention.  
Secondly Carruthers thinks that it seems hard to see what the evolutionary plausibility 
of a self-monitoring system would have been. Humans like all other animals needed 
to be able to cope with their external environment not monitor their own mentality in 
order to survive. The focus of early humans would have been outward rather than 
inward. (see also Prinz 2003 for a similar argument). x 
 
These two arguments together according to Carruthers make it very implausible that 
humans have direct introspective access to their intentions. It seems evolutionarily 
unnecessary that they do and if they did then the rich data from the empirical self-
blindness literature seem very hard to explain. 
  
But Carruthers thinks that there is a powerful objection to his argument and this 
objection involves two systems theory. According to this immensely popularxi theory 
humans operate with two distinct cognitive systems. System 1 is normally described 
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as fast, unconscious, parallel, and evolutionarily old, while system 2 is normally 
understood to be slow, conscious, serial, linguistic and evolutionarily new (e.g. 
Kahnemann 2011, Carruthers 2009, Evans 2007). 
Now if it is true that humans possess these two systems then this allows for an 
argument that accounts for the empirical data, takes the evolutionary considerations 
into account and at the same time allows to uphold our very strong folk intuition that 
we do know in a direct way when we have formed an intention. This argument, which 
looks like very bad news for Carruthers’ claim that self-knowledge of propositional 
attitudes is always interpretative, goes like this. According to two systems theory 
much of our behaviour is controlled by system 1 and we do not have direct conscious 
access to what happens in this system. So all the behaviour that is controlled by this 
system will have been produced by mental states of which we were not directly 
aware. This explains the empirical data, we are not directly aware of the behaviour 
produced by this system and need to self-interpret. This then leads to confabulations if 
the interpreting mechanisms are tricked.  It is also consistent with the evolutionary 
speculation, because system 1 is the old system and it is - as the speculation expects - 
purely world directed.  
But system 2, one might naturally think, also produces intentions and these we are 
aware of. Obviously, the data do not show that we are never aware of our intentions, 
but only that we sometimes get it wrong. But that is not surprising if we are only 
aware of some of our intentions in a direct way. System 2 is supposed to only control 
a fraction of our behaviour, so it is not surprising that we can find so many instances 
of ‘self-blindness’. But, it is not surprising either that we find it so intuitive that we 
are directly aware of our intentions, because system 2 is the one that makes the 
important decisions and we are always aware of those intentions. Again this is also 
consistent with the evolutionary considerations because system 2 is supposedly 
evolutionarily very young and systematic scrutiny of the thought process seems much 
more useful for a being on the verge of becoming a creature with a scientific mind. xii 
Taken together this separation of systems seems to provide a very powerful case 
against Carruthers claim that all our self-knowledge of propositional attitudes needs 
interpretation. The argument is very powerful, because it concedes that knowledge of 
some propositional attitudes does require interpretation (the system 1 attitudes) and 
because of that concession it can fully agree with the two arguments that Carruthers 
had for the interpretative model. At the same time it seems to show that the claim fails 
for system 2 propositional attitudes and it seems as if Carruthers here can’t use the 
same arguments again, because system is not evolutionarily old and having direct 
knowledge of system 2 propositional attitudes is not incompatible with the empirical 
literature that shows that we do not have direct access to a large part of our mental 
life. 
    
It is at this point in the dialectic that Carruthers uses the idea of settling a question in 
order to disarm the objection.  It is undeniable that in system 2 there are conscious 
inner speech events of the form ‘I will do P’, and it seems very likely that there is a 
causal connection between these inner speech events and doings of p by the agent, but 
Carruthers worries that the causal connection between the two events is not the right 
causal connection for the inner speech act to count as an intention. Why not? Because 
the inner speech act ‘I will do P’ does not settle the question as to whether an agent 
will in fact do P. Rather according to Carruthers all the conscious speech act will do is 
to prompt some further system 1 activity as to whether to interpret the speech act as a 
decision or not. Because of this, the inner speech act, while part of the causal chain 
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that leads to the action, is not the point where deliberation about whether or not to 
perform the action stops, but that is exactly what an intention is supposed to do. So 
the intention only really is formed after the unconscious interpretation of the speech 
act. But as this processing is unconscious we are not directly aware of it and need to 
interpret ourselves in order to know what our intentions are. In other words we never 
are directly aware of our intentions. Our conscious knowledge of our intentions is 
always theoretical and is based on us interpreting ourselves as having them.xiii 
  
3) Is Carruthers’ account at all plausible? 
 
On the face of it Carruthers’ argument seems to provide us with a problem for Moran 
like accounts. If it is true that we find out about our intentions by observing the 
consequences of system 1 decisions then the self-other asymmetry becomes very 
shallow. It is obviously still true that I have more access to all kinds of indicators that 
somebody else would not have normally (e.g. feedback from the body that it is in a 
state of action readiness), but obviously this kind of advantage is merely a difference 
in quantity rather than a deep qualitative difference. Our conscious self-knowledge of 
intentions is on this picture clearly observational in exactly the same way as our 
knowledge of the intentions of other people. On Carruthers’ picture it makes perfect 
sense to say that a neuroscientist might know about your intentions far more reliably 
than you do. In fact, one might think that this is not science fiction any longer. There 
is already an ever growing literature on claims by neuroscientists that they know the 
intentions of their subjects before the subject (famously Libet 1985, but also very 
interestingly Soon 2008).xiv Additionally, if the Carruthers picture is right it looks as 
if our knowledge of our intentions is also metacognitive. This is bad for Moran, 
because metacognitive processes do not obey transparency. I.e. for metacognitive 
processes it is not true that in order to find out whether one has an attitude one simply 
looks at the reasons for the first order proposition. They target the mental processes 
themselves rather than trying to settle a first order question. xvIf a neuroscientist tells 
me that I have the belief that p that normally will be good evidence that I have the 
belief, but it might not be good evidence for p itself. The reasons for the first order 
proposition and the metacognitive reasons for thinking that I am holding the belief 
come apart and that means that transparency fails in these cases.    
 
 
One way out of this problem is a flat denial of the plausibility of Carruthers story. 
This is what Al Mele opts for in his book Effective Intentions.  Mele here claims that 
there are clearly cases where conscious intentions lead directly to the sending of the 
appropriate motor signals (2011, page16). Mele does not give a positive reason why 
this ‘clearly’ is the case. Instead he provides us with an argument why the specifics of 
Carruthers’ account are implausible. Carruthers suggests a specific way in which an 
inner speech act causally contributes to an action. On this account agents normally 
have a standing desire to act in accordance with conscious inner speech events. When 
an agent says to herself in inner speech “I will  now”, then this can lead to the 
unconscious belief that one has decided to  and because of the standing desire the 
agent will then settle on ing. Mele does not elaborate why this account is implausible 
apart from the note that it would contradict his architecture of how an intention is 
supposed to workxvi. I will not attempt here to adjudicate, whether or not it is obvious 
that Mele’s account of the architecture of intention is reason enough to reject 
Carruthers account. It is certainly true that the specifics of the Carruthers story are 
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highly speculative and provide us with a rather roundabout story.xvii However, even if 
Mele is right about the implausibility of the specifics of Carruthers’ account, it seems 
perfectly possible to maintain Carruthers general point without buying into the 
standing desire story. All that Carruthers needs for his argument to go through is that 
some form of unconscious practical deliberation always follows the relevant inner 
speech act. It seems very plausible that something like this happens at least 
sometimes. When an agent tells herself to ‘get up now’ in the morning only to find 
that instead she has turned round to snooze for another 5 minutes it clearly seems to 
be the case that the inner speech act that sounded like a decision was in fact no such 
thing, because the matter was not settled or at least it was not settled in such a way 
that it conformed with the content of the inner speech. But obviously cases like this 
are unusual and it is not clear at all that we should think that all conscious inner 
speech is so devoid of the power of causing the agent to move directly. xviii  
Carruthers can also invoke Wegner in his defence. Wegner’s ‘I spy’ experiments 
seem to indicate that it is at least sometimes possible that we do mistake episodes of 
conscious inner speech for intentions. In these experiments subjects rated an action 
that they performed involuntarily as voluntary, if they had heard words consciously 
that were consistent with the movement. According to Wegner they misinterpreted the 
words they had heard consciously as intentions that produced their movement. 
But all of this hardly amounts to a knock down argument against the claim that at 
least sometimes practical deliberation does end with the forming of a conscious 
intention to which we might have direct accessxix and in this case Carruthers would be 
wrong. 
   
But then neither did anyone provide a clear cut argument that would show that 
Carruthers is wrong. Rather it seems to be a standoff between intuitions built around 
folk psychological intuitions and speculations extrapolated from the scientific data.  
To a degree then, whether or not Mele or Carruthers is right here seems like a simple 
empirical question. As such we can only await the outcome of the empirical tribunal. 
However, there is one thorny conceptual issue here. The question is whether there is 
unconscious practical deliberation. At the moment we don’t even know what 
processes there are and so we clearly lack some empirical data, but even if we did 
have the data we still would need to answer the question whether these processes 
really count as practical deliberation that settle the question whether or not to .   
In any case at the moment both alternatives seem live possibilities.xx If Mele is right 
and Carruthers is wrong then this worry about the nature of the self-other asymmetry 
is answered, but as long as we don’t yet know whether it is true that conscious inner 
speech is always followed by unconscious processes that count as practical 
deliberation it seems worthwhile to consider the option that Carruthers is right.  
 
 
Before moving on it seems worth discussing shortly one thought by Shepherd (2013 
p.28). Perhaps it makes sense to call the conscious inner speech act a decision that 
leads to the acquisition of an intention even if it is followed by more unconscious 
practical deliberation. That seems like an interesting possibility. After all the 
conscious event still does play an important role in producing the action and it does 
seem likely that folk psychology will have referred to a conscious event. However, as 
Shepherd admits this proposal is slightly revisionary and it is also not in line with 
Mele’s definition of a decision.  This is because, as we have discussed already, on the 
standard definition a decision leads to an intention and an intention is only an 
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intention if it settles the question. But if Carruthers is right then this is exactly what 
the conscious inner speech act does not achieve. 
 
So at the end of this section the state of play is that Carruthers account is at least one 
plausible contender for explaining how we acquire intentions and as long as this 
possibility is still alive and well, it also continues to pose a significant challenge to 
accounts of self-knowledge that rely on settling a question in order to acquire an 
intention. It still seems to be a possibility that we acquire intentions unconsciously 
and only find out about them indirectly by observational means.  
 
 
 
4) Does Carruthers account have anything to do with the Moran argument? 
 
So far we have assumed that it is uncontroversial what we mean by ‘settling a 
question’. But this might be unwise. Carruthers argument relies on a very specific 
psychological architecture, where conscious ‘decisions’ are system 2 inner speech 
acts and the claim that these inner speech acts never settle a question of whether to ,   
where this is understood as the claim that they never directly set the system on a 
course to  without further system 1 processing as to whether to . 
 
 
One first hint that it might be problematic to understand the ‘notion of settling a 
question’ in such a way can be found in the work of Pamela Hieroymi who clarifies 
what she means by settling a question: 
 
As should become clear, the appeal to "settling a question" is not meant to introduce 
an additional psychological state or event. Rather, the claim "to intend to  is to settle 
positively the question of whether to " simply notes the uncontroversial conceptual 
connection between an intention and a positive answer to a certain question (whether 
to  ). (Hieronymi, 2008 footnote 5 p.360) 
 
 
Hieronymi here clearly urges us to understand the notion of settling a question not as 
a psychological state at all, never mind a conscious inner speech act. Instead the 
phrase is used to provide us with a conceptual tool to ascertain whether a subject 
intends to . This is the case if the subject would give a positive answer to the 
question whether she indeed intends to . Interestingly, she also claims that this tool 
simply makes use of an “uncontroversial conceptual connection (emphasis added) 
between an intention and a positive answer” to the question whether someone intends 
to .  For her this link is crucial for understanding intentions, because the stating of 
intentions is essentially about providing reasons for why one performs or did perform 
an action. In answering the why question the agent provides her self-understanding of 
why she is performing the action. She claims that she is performing the action, 
because of the reason provided by settling the question. Without this self-
understanding the action would not be an intentional action and therefore the answer 
to the why question is the critical element that distinguishes a mere behaviour from an 
intentional action. 
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On Hieronymi’s understanding the relevant sense of ‘settling a question’ allows us to 
ascribe intentions by means of a conceptual link. On this account it is simply true by 
definition that a sincere positive answer to the question whether to  settles the 
question in the relevant sense and implies an intention to .xxi However, there is a 
glitch here. It is not obvious from the Hieronymi text exactly what a sincere positive 
answer to the why question looks like. The most natural way to understand this is to 
understand it as an assertion that a subject would actually make if asked. But we 
could also understand this asking of a question more metaphorically. It could be that a 
positive answer to the why question can be provided by any deliberative process that 
can settle a question.      
If the first understanding is the right interpretation of how we should understand the 
notion of ‘settling a question’ in the context of self-knowledge of intentions, then it is 
obvious that Carruthers argument is wrongheaded. On this account it simply does not 
matter that there might be further unconscious deliberation, which might in the end 
lead to the person not ing. It does not even matter that the person at the time of the 
sincere assertion was psychologically not settled on acting. All that matters is that she 
would have sincerely asserted that she had settled the matter. 
    
But while this account clearly takes care of Carruthers argument it does so at a high 
cost. Making the link between assertion and intention conceptual makes it impossible 
that one could ever be wrong about having an intention. This is very much not in the 
spirit of Moran’s project (to which Hieronymi is normally close) who wants his 
account to be not merely logical. It also disables conversations between philosophers 
and cognitive scientists on the nature of intentions, because intentions are now 
defined in such a way that they clearly do not belong in the realm of the sciences. For 
example, the large literature discussing the Libet experiments would be far more 
obviously misguided then assumed, because it would simply be impossible that there 
could be an unconscious intention. 
 Secondly, and more importantly it might well rob intentions of their most important 
distinguishing feature. Intentions in contrast to beliefs and desires are supposed to be 
executive statesxxii ( e.g. Bratman 1987, Mele 2009), but if we insist that there has to 
be a conceptual link between sincere assertion and intention then it might well turn 
out that they never are. If Carruthers psychological account turned out to be right and 
it really is the case that a person only ever is ready to  after postconscious system1 
processing, then the necessarily conscious intentions never have any executive 
dimension.  
 
If the second interpretation is right, however, then it looks as if the Carruthers 
argument still works and Hieronymi would have to accept that if the empirical data 
work out the way Carruthers predicts we have to accept that our conscious knowledge 
of our intentions must be observational. xxiii 
 
The way out of this predicament might be, if we simply accept that we are talking 
about two different senses of settling the question. In the one sense we are talking 
about consciously settling a question and it seems right that a sincere assertion that 
one has settled the question whether to  is conceptually linked to the fact that one 
consciously understands oneself as having settled on ing. However, understanding 
oneself in this way does not imply that one is really ready to , because if Carruthers 
is right that might require further processing. 
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But then the question becomes which of the two senses of settling a question is 
relevant for intention formation? 
 
The answer here surely is both: 
 
It seems right to say, that there is a conceptual connection between understanding 
ourselves consciously as having settled the question whether to  and the conscious  
intention to , but we also seem to need the settling of a question in the Carruthers’s 
sense in order to account for the executive dimension of intention.  
But once we accept that there are these two different relevant senses of settling a 
question, we can now go back to the solution suggested by Shepherd that the 
conscious decision does not have to directly cause the movement in order to count as 
having produced an intention, because it is still true that it has a significant influence 
on the likelihood of the action happening. 
 
We rejected this solution earlier, because it was in direct conflict with the central 
notion that an intention requires the settling of a question and it is clear that on his 
solution a “conscious decision” does not settle the question in the Carruthers sense. 
As we have established now that there are two senses of settling a question involved 
in intention formation, we have two options that both use the Shepherd move. 
 
On the one hand, we could say that consciously understanding oneself as having 
settled a question is necessary and sufficient for an intention. This would mean that 
sometimes intentions do not have the executive dimension that we ordinarily associate 
with them, but this does not mean that they do not have this dimension most of the 
time.  
This does not seem implausible and is in line with moves that have been made for 
belief.  Pacherie/Bayne (2005) have argued quite convincingly that the strict 
conditions for belief are too strong. xxiv Discussing monothematic delusions, they 
argue that in line with intuition we should allow that there are delusional beliefs, 
despite the fact that patients suffering from the delusion do normally not show a 
complete pattern of behaviour that would fit with the delusional belief. For example, 
patients suffering from Capgras syndrome who believe that their partner has been 
replaced by an impostor nevertheless normally do not call the police or take similar 
dramatic action which clearly would be called for in the case that there really was an 
impostor. Pacherie/Bayne argue that we should nevertheless think of these delusions 
as beliefs, because ordinary beliefs also tend to be context dependent and to not fulfil 
the high philosophical ideal of being in a fully coherent web that also controls 
behaviour in a coherent way.    
 
 
Alternatively, one could argue that the acquisition of an intention always requires the 
settling of the question in the Carruthers sense. But this does not rule out that we also 
allow that the conscious settling of the question is also highly significant. It might 
well be the case that it is necessary to settle a question consciously to acquire a 
conscious intention, but that while settling the question consciously makes it highly 
likely that an intention will be acquired it remains possible that one could be wrong 
about this. This would, obviously, be the case if the question got settled in a different 
way in unconscious processing.  This route takes the executive dimension of intention 
as seriously as possible and this is obviously a big advantage, because as mentioned 
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before one of the main arguments why we cannot do philosophy of action with only 
beliefs and desires was hinging on the point that only intentions are genuinely 
executive states.  
 
 
5) Conclusion: 
 
The stated aim of this paper was to get a better grip on the notion of ‘settling a 
question’ in the context of intention acquisition. The hope was that this would help us 
to better understand how it is that we know about our intentions and to help 
understand the intuitive self-other gap.  It now is time to take stock and to see what 
we achieved. As suspected it turned out that there are two different notions of ‘settling 
a question’ that are not clearly kept distinct in the literature.  The paper argued that 
both notions clearly contribute to our concept of intention and offered two different 
ways in which these contributions work. There was no space to work out whether one 
of these two options should be preferred and it is not obvious to me that this could be 
done. xxv 
However, there are obvious consequences from adopting either of the two models. If 
we adopt the first model that is good news for Moran like accounts. In that case it 
seems that the conscious settling of a question is all that is required for intention 
acquisition. While this still leaves the question of how the acquisition of an intention 
in that way leads to privileged knowledge there at least does not seem a problem with 
the fact that sometimes the acquisition of an intention does not settle the question in 
the Carruthers sense. We can use the Shepherd, Bayne story to make sure that it 
nevertheless seems ok to say that intentions do have an executive dimension.  
 
If we adopt the second model on the other hand, then it does seem to be the case that 
we need some modifications for Moran like accounts. In this case, while it would still 
be true that I could know about my conscious ‘decision’ in a special way, knowing 
about my intentions would become observational.  
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i And other propositional attitudes, but there is a large and specific literature on intentions. For this 
reason this paper focuses on intentions, but similar arguments could be made for e.g. beliefs. 
ii This seems very intuitive, but it has been challenged in the philosophical literature. Some 
philosophers argue that we can directly perceive the mental states of others (e.g. Gallagher 2008, 
Gallagher & Varga 2014).  
iii Even the name reflects the worry. The debate used to be known as the theory of mind debate, but 
people were worried that this seemed to prejudge that mindreading really is a theoretical activity. 
iv Or at least very shallow. Theory theorist Alison Gopnik (1992) e.g. explains the intuition of the self-
other gap with the fact that we are experts about our own mentality. Like chess experts might feel that 
they can directly see mate in three, when we know that this seeing is built on the intense practice of the 
relevant inferences it seems to us that we directly know which mental states we are in, when in reality 
we know this because of highly automatised inferences. 
v Mele argues that this is because in Libet’s veto experiments subjects are clearly settled on not 
moving, so the conscious urge to move they have before they abort the movement cannot be an 
intention to move, because subjects were always settled on not moving.   
vi Hieronymi discusses the structural similarity at length in her 2008 Reason for Believing 
vii Thanks to Mike Ridge for reminding me to clarify the akrasia point. 
viii To be clear: I am emphasising here the point that Carruthers does argue that self-knowledge of 
intentions is observational just as the knowledge of the attitudes of others and that is the critical point 
under discussion here. However, he does argue as well that in the case of self-knowledge  the system 
has access to more material to make the inference, because we are e.g. introspectively aware of our 
inner speech. 
ix Shepherd (2013) runs the argument that confabulating the motives for your decision 
does do nothing to show that you were not aware of the decision. While the findings 
discussed under the zombie challenge might show that it is possible to modulate a 
decision with unconscious influences this does not show that the decision itself was 
not conscious. While it e.g. might be possible to influence a moral decision like 
whether to help a stranger or not by priming them unconsciously this does not mean 
that the decision of whether to help or not is unconscious (see Bayne 2013 for a 
similar argument). That is an important clarification, but these studies are not 
therefore unimportant, because they undermine the idea that these conscious states are 
real decisions, because decisions are supposed to cause action, but here it looks as if 
the state that the agent is not aware of produces the action (whether to help or not) and 
the conscious event seems to have little influence. Obviously, this is no knock down 
argument, because the conscious events could play an important role, but it puts the 
onus on the consciousness defender, if it looks as if the story could also work without 
it. 
x In the Opacity of Mind Carruthers makes the further evolutionary observation why this outward 
directedness also predicts that humans would have understood other minds first. Humans live in highly 
complex social environments, where one crucial element of the environment that the individual has to 
cope with is the other human.  
Being able to predict the behavior of conspecifics is here clearly a great advantage (p.64-66)  
xi But not uncontroversial see e.g. Keren & Schul (2009) 
xii Shepherd (2014) e.g. argues that being able to form an intention on whether or not to continue to 
deliberate is an important advantage of conscious decision making. 
xiii Carruthers has a very elaborate account of what he sees as the right cognitive architecture for this 
self-interpretation process involving e.g. an unconscious mind reading module. But as far as I see the 
argument does not depend on accepting this architecture.  As the argument is stronger anyway if it does 
not require a specific and highly contested architecture I do not discuss this architecture here.    
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xiv Obviously, these results are controversial and even if we were to take them at face value they would 
still not show that neuroscientists could know of all intentions before the subject. Thanks to Leon de 
Bruin for pushing me on this point. Still it might seem worrying enough that neuroscientists know 
about a large class of intentions earlier than the conscious subject and at least for those intentions 
Carruthers claim seems to be borne out by empirical studies already. Carruthers argument is supposed 
to give us a reason to suspect that this holds not only for those limited cases but for all intentions.   
xv So if Carruthers is right, then the point that Kloosterboer (this issue) makes for emotions actually 
would hold for intentions as well. Knowing about our intentions does at least have a self-referential 
component.  
xvi For a very similar point see Shepherd (2013) 
xvii However, it might actually fit quite nicely with recently quite popular mind 
shaping accounts. The idea that our folk psychology provides us with a normative 
framework that orients our behaviour (Pettit& McGeer 2002, Zawidsky, 2008) fits 
quite nicely with Carruthers’ implementation idea that our conscious inner speech 
assertion of having an intention leads to the relevant behaviour via a desire to act 
according to these assertions because they are norms.  
 
xviii There seems also to be neuro-scientific evidence to back up such a view. The neuroscientist 
Gerhard Roth (2003) for example claims that all voluntary actions go through unconscious censorship 
that is concerned with two questions, whether the action is better than any other action and whether the 
intended action is appropriate.   
xix see e.g. Bayne (2006) for a similar point  
xx Thanks to Dave Ward, Josh Shepherd and Suilin Lavelle who all raised this important issue.  
xxi Importantly, Hieronymi does not think that any assertions or other intentional actions can be what 
settles a question. Settling a question is according to Hieronymi an evaluative not an intentional 
activity. So asserting an answer to a question is a way of finding out whether a person has settled a 
question. It is not the question settling itself.  
xxii i.e. the crucial characteristic of intentions is that they are directly linked to the execution of the 
action, in contrast to other attitudes like beliefs and desires whose role in practical deliberation can be 
detached from any potential behaviour.  
xxiii It would however be still possible that we have special agentive unconscious knowledge of our 
intentions. This would have interesting consequences for the importance of those unconscious states for 
moral agency. I explore this option in a forthcoming paper.   
xxiv Eric Schwitzgebel in fact makes this point in the context of self-knowledge of beliefs in a 2011 
paper. While I am happy to accept his pluralist approach for belief, intentions with their executive 
dimension seem to demand a special treatment. 
xxv Obviously, there is also a different conclusion that one could draw from this paper. If it is the case 
that the notion of settling a question is less clear than we thought it was, then perhaps it was a mistake 
in the first place to rely too much on it. It might e.g. be the case that there are different types of 
intentions and perhaps the idea of settling a question applies only to some or even none of them. The 
idea of motor intentions as suggested by Elisabeth Pacherie (e.g.2006) looks like a prime candidate 
here. I am happy to accept that that is a possibility. But given how important the notion is in the 
philosophical literature from Anscombe through to Bratman and Mele  I think that would be also a very 
significant result. Thanks to Leon de Bruin for pressing me on this.   
